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THE RULE OF LAW SOLD SHORT 
A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND 
BALANCING. By Francisco J. Urbina.1 New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xii + 267. $110.00 
(cloth). 
Richard Stacey2 
INTRODUCTION 
In his latest contribution to the theoretical literature on rights 
adjudication and the rule of law, Professor Francisco Urbina adds 
to the chorus of criticism levelled against the principle of 
proportionality and methods of judicial decision-making that rely 
on the balancing of constitutional rights and competing interests. 
To those unfamiliar with the background of this long-running 
jurisprudential debate, the principle of proportionality offers a 
heuristic for judges and lawmakers to determine whether the 
statutory limitation of a constitutionally protected right is justified 
by the benefits the rights-limiting measure produces. A court 
should uphold rights-limiting legislation if the extent to which the 
measure limits the affected right is proportionate to the good it 
produces, or, in other words, if the good achieved by limiting the 
right outweighs the harm it causes. 
In A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing, Urbina 
argues that the principle of proportionality is fatally susceptible to 
a conspectus of objections, and that public law should accordingly 
abandon proportionality analysis altogether. Instead, we should 
conceive of constitutional rights as narrowly specified and 
absolute legal categories that a government is never justified in 
limiting. For Urbina, upholding rights and the interests they 
protect is a categorical imperative. In this respect he departs from 
the constitutional orthodoxy represented by the limitations 
clauses of post-war constitutional documents in Canada, 
 
 1. Assistant Professor of Law, Pontificia Universidad Católica, Chile. 
 2. Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. 
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Germany, Israel, South Africa and in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, for example, and prefers a model of rights 
adjudication more in line with the position in the United States. 
Urbina devotes the majority of the book, Parts I and II, to 
surfacing proportionality’s purportedly fatal flaw: either 
proportionality analysis is blind to the moral imperatives of 
human rights, or it can accommodate these important moral 
considerations only by compromising the rule-of-law values of 
predictability and certainty (p. 2). The principle of proportionality 
is thus caught on the horns of an irresoluble dilemma. Although 
Urbina leaves enough space in the final chapter of the book only 
to sketch the outlines of his alternative approach, it is a novel 
solution to the proportionality debate that moves it beyond 
arguments about which version of the proportionality test would 
be best to adopt, all things considered, and towards a more direct 
consideration of how a political community might best protect the 
rights to which it is constitutionally committed. The book is a 
valuable and thought-provoking contribution to the literature for 
this reason. 
I have two concerns about Urbina’s argument, however. 
First, his critique of proportionality analysis relies on a conception 
of the rule of law that ignores its connections to the deep 
normative principles of a legal system, selling the rule of law short 
by focusing only on the value of holding officials to the provisions 
of formal legal rules.3 Second, the alternative model of absolute 
rights that Urbina proposes seems to rely as much on 
proportionality and balancing as the limitations models he 
criticises. I present these concerns more fully below, following a 
careful summary of the core of Urbina’s argument. 
THE ASSAULT ON PROPORTIONALITY 
In the opening pages of the book, Urbina sets out the 
standard analytical model through which courts and lawmakers 
assess the proportionality of rights-limiting statutory measures 
(pp. 4-9). This four-stage inquiry asks, first, whether the purposes 
for which a statutory measure limits a right is a legitimate or 
 
 3. I make the argument about the connections between proportionality analysis and 
a rich, normative conception of the rule of law more fully in Richard Stacey, The 
Magnetism of Moral Reasoning and the Principle of Proportionality in Comparative 
Constitutional Adjudication, __ AM. J. COMP. L. ___ (forthcoming 2018). 
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valuable one for a government to pursue; second, whether the 
measure is rationally connected to, or likely to achieve that 
objective; third, whether the means adopted to achieve the 
objective impair the affected rights as little as possible (the least 
restrictive means or minimal impairment test); and fourth, 
whether the balance between the good achieved by limiting a right 
and the harm caused by doing so is proportional “in the strict 
sense.” 
A major element of the book’s architecture is the distinction 
Urbina draws between two conceptions of the principle of 
proportionality, and the alternate versions of the proportionality 
test that follow. One group of approaches adopts what he calls the 
“maximisation account of proportionality,” in terms of which a 
judge or lawmaker faced with a choice between upholding a right 
against limitation or allowing its limitation in pursuit of some 
competing interest is mandated to prefer the option that produces 
the most good. Any losses occasioned by either striking down or 
allowing a rights limitation must be compensated by the gains 
achieved by doing so. Maximization in this sense involves a 
quantitative comparison of the good each option would produce 
in order to come to a conclusion about where the greater good lies 
(pp. 18-21). Urbina offers the work of Robert Alexy, David 
Beatty and Aharon Barak as examples of the maximisation 
account of proportionality (chapter 2).4 
The second conception of proportionality, which Urbina calls 
“unconstrained moral reasoning,” does not demand the 
application of one specific decision-making mechanism for 
determining the proportionality of a rights limitation. Rather, 
judges will engage directly with the reasons given by the parties 
and assess them through “practical reasoning unconstrained by a 
particular legal method or other legal categories. The idea of 
justification,” Urbina goes on, “is at the centre of the main 
theories of proportionality as unconstrained moral reasoning” (p. 
126). While maximization accounts of proportionality rely on 
utilitarian calculations of public good to generate a preference for 
the limitation of a right or the striking down of rights-limiting 
legislation, this alternative group of approaches requires 
government to balance all the relevant moral considerations and 
 
 4. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS (2012); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002); 
DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004). 
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demonstrate that there are sufficiently strong reasons that justify 
the restriction of constitutional rights or the striking down of 
legislation passed by a democratically elected legislature. At the 
base of this requirement is a commitment to moral autonomy, 
both in the sense that any interference with the autonomy 
inherent in constitutional rights must be justified and in the sense 
that making moral arguments in support of one or other outcome 
recognises and responds to the human capacity for rationality and 
reason (pp. 126-31). Theorists in this camp, whose work espouses 
this “culture of justification,” include Mattias Kumm, Kai Möller, 
and Etienne Mureinik.5 
As a small matter of jurisprudential taxonomy, I am not sure 
I agree with Urbina that the version of proportionality analysis 
described by Aharon Barak should be seen as a “maximisation 
account” rather than an account centred on moral reasoning. 
Barak’s view is that the outcome of the proportionality test should 
depend on whether upholding a right on one hand or allowing its 
limitation on the other is more “socially important” to the 
political community affected.6 It is, of course, true that preferring 
the option that is more socially important involves the 
maximization of social importance, but the morally rich question 
of how much socially important stuff each option delivers has to 
be answered before any morally neutral maximization can take 
place. Robert Alexy’s proposal for a “triadic” scale on which the 
benefits and disadvantages of a rights limitation may be compared 
also relies on an exercise in moral reasoning to work out whether 
the extent of the infringement is serious, moderate, or minor, and 
whether the importance of the public good sought to be achieved 
by the limitation is high, moderate, or low.7 
 
 5. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: 
The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141 (2010); 
KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2012); Etienne 
Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. 
RTS. 31 (1994). Urbina relies heavily on the work of Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat 
in this section of the book to describe the conception of proportionality as unconstrained 
moral reasoning: see MOSHE COHEN ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2013). However, in other work Cohen-Eliya and Porat are 
critical of these approaches to proportionality analysis and prefer an approach that 
depends on the more constrained and quantifiable legs of the proportionality test. See infra 
note 9. 
 6. BARAK, supra note 4, at 349, 361. See also the judgment of the Israeli Supreme 
Court in HCJ 14/86 Labor v. Israel Film & Theatre Council [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421, 343. 
 7. ALEXY, supra note 4, at 402–11. 
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Disagreements in sorting proportionality theorists into one 
or other of the camps Urbina describes may flow from the fact 
that the standard model of proportionality analysis is capacious 
and flexible enough to accommodate both conceptions of 
proportionality (p. 7). There is no bright line between the two 
approaches, and indeed it remains a matter of some debate 
whether Canadian jurisprudence relies more on maximization or 
moral reasoning to settle rights disputes.8 
Maximization accounts lend themselves to more quantifiable 
or mechanical application, and thus tend to avoid the flexible and 
wide-ranging final stage of the inquiry in favour of a focus on the 
first three legs of the inquiry. David Beatty prefers a version of 
the proportionality test that never reaches the inquiry into 
proportionality in the strict sense, and rests the outcome of the 
analysis on whether the government has adopted the mechanism 
of achieving legitimate objectives that limits rights as little as 
possible.9 A balance must be struck, on this view, between the 
means adopted to pursue an objective and the extent of the 
infringement of rights: judges and lawmakers need never consider 
the tricky and contentious question of whether a right is more 
valuable than the objectives the limitation purports to achieve. 
Approaches to proportionality analysis that rely on moral 
reasoning, by contrast, focus attention on the fourth-stage inquiry 
into proportionality in the strict sense. Inquiries that are restricted 
to considering the relationship between the means adopted to 
pursue some valuable objective and its effect on rights do not 
capture all the moral implications of the policy alternatives. As 
Aharon Barak argues, it may well be that shooting an apple thief 
is the only and therefore least restrictive means of stopping the 
thief and pursuing the objective of a theft-free society (or at least 
a society in which thieves are brought to justice), but leaves open 
the question of whether shooting an apple thief is a morally 
acceptable response to the scourge of apple theft.10 It requires an 
exercise in moral reasoning to work out which of the competing 
 
 8. See, for example, Denise Reaume, Limitations on Constitutional Rights: The 
Logic of Proportionality, U. Oxford Legal Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 26/2009, August 
2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463853. 
 9. BEATTY, supra note 4; see also Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and Substantive 
Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 
38 ISRAEL L. REV. 262, 263 (2005). 
 10. Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 373 
(2007); BARAK supra note 4, at 342–43. 
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interests a society should value more—a theft-free society and 
justice for wrongdoers on one hand, or respect for bodily integrity 
and due process on the other. Proportionality as moral reasoning 
thus favours the inquiry into proportionality in the strict sense, 
requiring a balance to be struck between the value of rights and 
the value of competing interests. 
But whichever approach to proportionality is followed, and 
whatever considerations are thrown into the scales to be balanced, 
Urbina argues there are reasons to avoid proportionality analysis 
altogether. Maximization accounts of proportionality are 
susceptible, he argues, to two well-known criticisms: the 
incommensurability objection (chapter 3) and the problem of 
moral blindness (chapters 4 and 5). The incommensurability 
objection holds that there is neither a common metric nor a single 
unifying property against which the value of rights and competing 
social interests can be measured, compared, or balanced in a 
meaningful or comprehensible way.11 It may well be that the 
objectives achieved by a measure that limits a constitutional right 
realizes some property or value to a greater degree than 
upholding the right would realize some completely separate 
property, but the comparison of these two properties is as 
meaningless as asking whether a lot of happiness is better than a 
moderate amount of blue paint (p. 47).12 The value that protecting 
rights achieves is not commensurable with the value that fulfilling 
a competing interest produces. Any attempt to resolve rights 
disputes by attempting to maximize good (or utility or value) is 
undermined by the incommensurability of the goods between 
which lawmakers and judges have to choose. 
 
 11. The incommensurability objection is made in existing work, including some by 
Urbina. See, e.g., Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 
INT’L J. CON. L. 468 (2009); Grégoire N Webber, Proportionality, Balancing and the Cult 
of Constitutional Rights Scholarship, 23 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 179 (2010); and Francisco J 
Urbina, Is it Really that Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and “Balancing and 
Reasoning,” 27 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 167 (2014). 
 12. The metaphor that is often used to capture the problem of incommensurability is 
that it is impossible to compare the length of a piece of string to the weight of a stone. See 
Niels Petersen, How to Compare the Length of Lines to the Weight of Stones: Balancing 
and the Resolution of Value Conflicts in Constitutional Law, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1387 (2013). 
See also John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: 
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P George ed., 1992); James Griffin, 
Incommensurability, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL 
REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Stuart Woolman, LIMITATION, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop eds., 2nd ed., 2005). 
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The second objection, the problem of moral blindness, goes 
to the mechanical and formalistic nature of quantifying and 
comparing the value of rights and builds on the idea that we 
protect rights precisely because they have immeasurable value. 
Proportionality understood as maximization undervalues the 
intuition that there is some special normative force to the interests 
that rights protect, and which justifies according rights a special 
claim to pre-eminence in the legal system. Maximisation allows a 
legislature to ignore the special normative force of rights if there 
is a compelling reason to do so, and in turn undermines any 
commitment to rights as trumps,13 side constraints14 or spheres of 
individual inviolability15 (pp. 100-05). 
Urbina accepts, however, that conceiving of proportionality 
as unconstrained moral reasoning can meet both of these 
objections (pp. 136-37). A decisionmaker need rely on a common 
scale or metric for comparing rights and competing interests only 
if her objective is to produce a quantified, cardinal ranking of 
rights and competing interests—what other scholars have called 
“interest balancing.”16 In this case, incommensurability between 
the value of rights and competing interests presents a serious 
obstacle. But cardinal rankings are not the only way to compare—
or balance—rights and competing interests. It is possible to bring 
them into an ordinal relationship according to the extent to which 
each option fulfils a political community’s deeply held moral 
convictions. What others have called “balancing as reasoning”17 
or Socratic “public reason oriented justification”18 requires 
decisionmakers to justify the choice between upholding a right or 
allowing its limitation on the basis that one or other option better 
fulfils these moral convictions. These justifications rely on “open-
ended moral reasoning” rather than numeric quantification. For 
this reason, they need no quantitative metrics and sidestep the 
incommensurability objection. At the same time, open-ended 
moral reasoning is explicitly sensitive to the moral foundations of 
rights, and is not susceptible to the problem of moral blindness 
either. 
 
 13. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1978). 
 14. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29 (1974). 
 15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24–25 (rev. ed., 1999). 
 16. Kai Möller, Proportionality: Challenging the Critics, 10 INT’L J. CON. L. 709, 715 
(2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kumm, supra note 5, at 143. 
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Open-ended moral reasoning is, however, susceptible to the 
third of the complaints that Urbina raises against proportionality 
analysis. The open-endedness of balancing as reasoning or public 
reason oriented justification makes it reliant, not on numeric or 
mechanical calculations, but on decisionmakers’ unpredictable, 
freewheeling, unprincipled, ad hoc, impressionistic and subjective 
moral intuitions. The unpredictability of open-ended moral 
reasoning renders it inconsistent with the rule-of-law demand that 
the law deliver certainty and predictability to human relations.19 
Urbina complains that meeting the incommensurability objection 
and engaging frontally with rights’ moral imperatives leaves 
proportionality analysis without any legal guidance and open to a 
panoply of negative effects that flow from legally unconstrained 
adjudication (chapters 7 and 8). The dilemma that traps 
proportionality, Urbina argues, lies in the tension between 
guidance and moral reasoning: 
Because constraint is the necessary consequence of guidance 
(if the law guides the judge towards a particular solution to the 
case, then other alternative solutions are excluded), the more 
specific the guidance provided by proportionality, the more it 
will constrain the reasoning of the judge, and thus the less it 
will allow for open-ended moral reasoning oriented towards 
justification (p. 139). 
For Urbina, either proportionality analysis involves a 
predictable and systematic quantitative assessment of competing 
policy alternatives that is at best morally insensitive and at worst 
incomprehensible in the face of incommensurability, or it depends 
on unpredictable and unconstrained moral reasoning that 
undermines the rule of law. 
With proportionality caught in this bind, Urbina proposes a 
formalistic and categorical approach to human rights adjudication 
that leaves no room for rights limitation at all (chapter 9). Rights 
should instead be specified narrowly, categorically protecting core 
interests from any interference no matter how compelling the 
reasons for interference might be. Urbina’s proposal, “in short, is 
to specify human rights into a body of legal categories capable of 
providing legal guidance, and to apply such body of legal 
categories to the solution of human rights cases” (p. 216). He 
argues that this is nothing new to the law as a whole, since there 
 
 19. Beatty, supra note 4, at 171; Tsakyrakis, supra note 11, at 482. 
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are numerous legal categories through which judges resolve 
disputes (pp. 218-23). And in some ways, this is nothing new to 
rights jurisprudence either, since rights adjudication in the United 
States is concerned more with clearly specifying the boundaries of 
constitutional rights and considering whether they have been 
breached than with questions of whether the breach of a widely 
and capaciously conceived right is justifiable (pp. 247-51). 
URBINA’S IMPOVERISHED CONCEPTION  
OF THE RULE OF LAW 
Urbina’s rationale for abandoning the principle of 
proportionality in rights analysis is that, however it is conceived, 
it cannot escape at least one of three serious objections. On the 
logic of Urbina’s argument, though, if proportionality analysis can 
be shown to be consistent with the rule of law and to function just 
as predictably as other forms of legal analysis, then the principle 
of proportionality can be rescued from the dilemma in which 
Urbina finds it. 
This is the first of two concerns I have with the argument in 
the book, and it flows from Urbina’s reliance on an impoverished 
conception of the rule of law. While Urbina understands the rule 
of law to require the legal system to operate with predictability 
and certainty, predictability and certainty are better conceived of 
as products of a legal system that complies with the rule of law. 
The subjects of a legal system are ruled by law rather than the 
whim of individual rulers as long as they know what the law allows 
them to do, and as long as officials are constrained in what they 
are empowered to do by previously declared rules. Lon Fuller’s 
eight principles of legality explain the qualities that a legal system 
must have if it is to ensure the rule of law and not the rule of 
officials. The first seven of these principles require the rules that 
govern peoples’ interactions with one another to be clear, non-
retroactive, stable over time and mutually consistent, to demand 
from people only what is not impossible, to apply generally to 
everyone and to be made known to the public.20 Compliance with 
these principles, Fuller explains, allows a legal system to create 
order in society. The principle of congruence, the eighth of 
Fuller’s principles, demands that official conduct is congruent 
with rules of law and that the exercise of public power remains 
 
 20. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed., 1969). 
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within the limits set by the laws already made known to the 
public.21 People can take for granted the stable operation of the 
legal system and make life plans accordingly, precisely because 
official conduct is predictable as long as it remains bound by 
previously declared rules. 
Moreover, the rule of law requires congruence not only 
between official conduct and formal rules, but also between 
official conduct and the normative principles on which the legal 
system is founded. This is especially so in the context of 
constitutional rights, precisely because constitutional rights are 
worded in general and abstract language.22 It is difficult to work 
out whether official conduct—the passage of legislation, for 
example—is congruent with constitutional rights without a 
process of interpretation that depends on something more than 
just the plain text of the constitutional provision concerned. 
Determining whether official conduct is congruent with 
constitutional rights must turn to an excavation of the deep 
normative principles on which rights are based.23 
Urbina’s conception of the rule of law is much narrower. He 
not only understands the principle of congruence to require 
official conduct to adhere to only clear and unambiguous rules of 
positive law, but suggests further that any consideration of 
normativity is inconsistent with the rule of law. The “values 
 
 21. In the revised edition of The Morality of Law, Fuller calls the principle of 
congruence the “very essence of the Rule of Law,” id. at 209–10. Further, holding officials 
to previously declared rules affirms the view of human beings as morally autonomous by 
ensuring that the plans they make, on the basis of their understanding of what the law 
allows them to do, will not be upset by official conduct that is incongruent with, and 
unpredictable in light of, previously declared rules, id. at 162–63. Note that predictability 
and certainty are not among Fuller’s principles of legality, but are characteristics of a legal 
system that adheres to these principles of legality. See also Richard Stacey, Popular 
Sovereignty and Revolutionary Constitution-making, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 170–72 (David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn eds., 
2016). 
 22. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 
1994); see also Grégoire Webber, Rights and the Rule of Law in the Balance, 129 L.Q.R. 
399, 410 (2013). 
 23. In this sense, rights adjudication looks like the hard cases Ronald Dworkin and 
H. L. A. Hart argued about. While Hart submitted that in the penumbra of legal 
uncertainty outside the law’s core of settled meaning, judges have an unfettered discretion 
to make new law, H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–15 (1958), Dworkin argued that judge-made law in these hard 
cases must remain congruent with the fundamental principles of justice that run 
throughout the legal system. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 17. 
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associated with [the rule of law]—such as certainty and 
predictability in human relations,” Urbina asserts, 
are severely harmed, if not sacrificed, when we make law 
through legal categories that are so vague that they allow 
judges to reason morally on what is the best solution to the 
case, without any effective constraint imposed by the law. The 
law then becomes uncertain and unpredictable, and there is no 
guarantee that state power will be bound by clear and 
previously established legal rules, known by its subjects, and 
applied equally to those in the same situation (p. 148). 
But rights cases often—perhaps usually—evoke deep 
disagreements about what the position in the law actually is.24 The 
law requires that rights be respected and protected nevertheless. 
In these cases it is not possible to predict what the law allows or 
requires members of society and officials to do without first 
resolving disagreements about the content of rights. And because 
the plain text of rights evokes these very disagreements, coming 
to a conclusion about what the law requires and whether official 
conduct is congruent with it has to rely on arguments that go to 
the normative foundations of these rights. A consideration of the 
moral foundations of the law in general and rights specifically is 
thus not inevitably incompatible with a commitment to the rule of 
law, as Urbina believes it is, but may in fact be required by it.25 
Judges and lawmakers must pay attention to the moral 
foundations of the legal system if they are to ensure that the laws 
that constitute that system, which constrain the conduct of 
officials and guide the choices of the members of society, are 
congruent with the moral and normative foundations on which a 
political community is built. Urbina’s rejection of moral reasoning 
as inconsistent with the rule of law betrays a particularly 
formalistic conception of the rule of law that is by no means the 
 
 24. Jeremy Waldron’s work on the rule of law and rights adjudication begins from 
the premise that serious disagreements about the nature and content of rights are 
inevitable and must be taken seriously by any theory of law. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW 
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 AM. 
J. JURIS. 75 (1998). 
 25. Richard Stacey, Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation 
Seriously in the Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL. (2017) (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2843765. 
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only game in town,26 and in fact overlooks the connection between 
normativity and the rule of law, and thus, moral reasoning and the 
rule of law. 
More than this, there is little reason to accept Urbina’s 
contention that moral reasoning is any less predictable or certain 
than any other form of legal reasoning. Consider how the 
founding principles or values a political community sets out in its 
constitution aim to capture that community’s moral and 
normative commitments at the same time as they aim to guide 
judicial decisionmaking and lawmaking. Public officials are bound 
by these fundamental normative principles just as much as by the 
formal rules of law set out in statutes. What is required by any 
particular formal rule therefore presupposes that that formal rule 
is congruent with underlying normative principles. This is, after 
all, what a commitment to constitutional supremacy means. The 
familiar process of legal interpretation that goes into working out 
precisely what a formal rule requires will often refer to these 
normative principles.27 
Legal interpretation, even of formal rules, is thus infused 
with the normative commitments at the foundation of the legal 
system. The moral reasoning that judges and lawmakers engage 
in when working out whether upholding a right or allowing its 
limitation is more closely aligned with the normative 
commitments set out as basic constitutional principles is therefore 
just as predictable and certain as many other instances of legal 
interpretation. 
Another way of putting the concern with Urbina’s argument 
is that he sees unconstrained moral reasoning as unpredictable, 
and for this reason necessarily incompatible with the rule of law. 
But surely moral reasoning directed towards upholding the 
principles already set out in a constitution is constrained by the 
interpretive limits of those principles? From a practical 
 
 26. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity? 13 L. & 
PHIL. 259, 275–80 (1994); T. R. S. Allan, The Moral Unity of Public Law, 67 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 1 (2017). 
 27. Consider the principle of statutory interpretation, set out for example by the 
South African Constitutional Court, that when a provision of positive law admits of two 
equally plausible interpretations officials must prefer the interpretation that is consistent 
with constitutional principles: Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and 
Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), paras 21–
23. 
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perspective, the global jurisprudence of rights limitations provides 
a number of examples of constitutional principles that constrain 
and direct proportionality analysis: in South Africa, rights 
limitations must be consistent with the commitment to “human 
dignity, equality and freedom” in an “open and democratic 
society”;28 in Canada, limitations must be justifiable in a “free and 
democratic society”;29 and in Israel, limitations must befit “the 
values of the State of Israel” as “a Jewish and democratic state” 
and which in turn include “human dignity and liberty.”30 These 
are capacious principles, to be sure, but they set limits to 
constitutional jurisprudence and guide judges in these 
jurisdictions all the same. 
Urbina’s argument for abandoning proportionality depends 
on the irresolubility of the dilemma proportionality analysis faces, 
and on the conclusion that neither conception of proportionality 
can overcome all three objections. But proportionality as 
constitutionally constrained moral reasoning does meet all three 
complaints. Urbina’s primary reason for proposing the 
abandonment of the principle of proportionality in rights 
adjudication thus loses much of its persuasive force. 
BALANCING IN THE SPECIFICATION  
OF LEGAL CATEGORIES 
My second concern with Urbina’s argument goes to his 
justification for an alternative, categorical approach to rights. In 
Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin famously makes the 
case for rights as trumps, setting out what looks to be something 
like a categorical imperative for the protection of rights. He states 
in various places, for example, that any infringement of rights in 
pursuit of collective social objectives “threatens to destroy the 
 
 28. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 36. 
 29. Constitution Act of 1982, section 1 (Can.). 
 30. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), articles 1, 1A and 8. For 
discussion of the values of the state of Israel and how the Supreme Court of Israel has 
attempted to provide concrete guidance to how they operate in assessing the 
constitutionality of laws, see Aeyal M Gross, Global Values and Local Realities: The Case 
of Israeli Constitutional Law, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES 
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Denis Davis, Alan 
Richter & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2015); AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION 
IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., Princeton University Press, 2005); H.C.J. 6821/93 United 
Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village IsrSC 49(4), 221 (1995); H.C.J. 212/03 at 
354; H.C.J. 4112/99 Adalah – The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority v. Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa Municipality IsrSC 56(5) 393 (2002). 
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concept of individual rights,”31 discards the position that rights are 
trumps,32 and is ultimately morally wrong.33 But even Dworkin 
accepts that rights are not absolute, and that it is sometimes 
appropriate to resolve conflicts between two rights by balancing one 
right against another.34 It is acceptable to limit a right, Dworkin says, 
for a “compelling reason . . . that is consistent with the supposition 
on which the original right must be based.”35 
One way of seeing Dworkin’s comments here is as a form of 
balancing as reasoning familiar to proportionality analysis. The 
trumps here are not the rights themselves so much as the 
principles and commitments that rights express. Whichever policy 
option represents the best way to fulfill these commitments is 
what we should accord the pre-eminence of trumps.36 Another 
way of understanding Dworkin’s view is that we should continue 
to see rights as trumps, but only to the extent that they do protect 
or advance these fundamental normative commitments. And to 
the extent that they do this, they are absolute and categorically 
inviolable. This is the approach to which I suspect Urbina would 
be more sympathetic, since it preserves an illimitable core of 
rights that will never be balanced against competing interests. 
But notice how the process of filling in the absolutely 
protected core of rights depends on coming to the conclusion that 
protecting certain interests and not others is the best way to 
achieve the normative commitments on which the pre-eminence 
of rights depends. This necessarily involves some degree of 
balancing among the competing alternatives, weighing up 
whether protecting something absolutely as a right or excluding it 
from the sphere of things a right protects and allowing the pursuit 
of some other interest better realises our normative 
commitments. The only way we can come to a view about what it 
is that rights protect absolutely involves some degree of 
proportionality analysis. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Urbina seems to endorse this 
conclusion. Specifying the content of absolute rights, he says in 
 
 31. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 197–99. 
 32. RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE (2006), 48–49. 
 33. Id. at 31. 
 34. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 191, 199; DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 49-51. 
 35. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 200. 
 36. See Jacob Weinrib, When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of 
Proportionality (Aug. 30, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2832405. 
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the closing pages of the book, “requires some open-ended moral 
and political reasoning on behalf of judges, since they need to 
come up with their own understanding of the specification of the 
relevant human rights” (p. 250). It is unclear how Urbina can be 
committed to a view of rights analysis that rejects open-ended 
moral reasoning in the balancing of rights and competing interests 
in particular cases of conflict, yet rely on open-ended moral 
reasoning in specifying the content of each right to be protected 
absolutely. The reasons for which he criticises proportionality as 
unconstrained moral reasoning would seem to apply as strongly 
to his alternative position. Urbina attempts to meets this concern 
by intimating that his alternative proposal for rights adjudication 
sidesteps rule-of-law complaints about predictability and 
certainty because judges “are guided by the legal categories in 
place” (p. 250). But surely, then, he must also be bound to admit 
that any version of proportionality analysis that is similarly guided 
by legal categories—such as the principles and values set out in a 
constitutional document—is just as consistent with the rule of law 
as his alternative. 
Ultimately, Urbina is caught in an irresoluble dilemma all of 
his own: either his alternative model of rights adjudication is as 
reliant on unpredictable moral reasoning as the conceptions of 
proportionality analysis he criticises, or both proportionality 
analysis and his alternative model are equally consistent with the 
rule of law and there is accordingly no compelling reason to 
abandon morally rich, public reason oriented conceptions of 
proportionality analysis in the first place. 
 
